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Abstract
Previous empirical research on democracy and global warming has mainly questioned whether democracy contributes to
climate protection. However, there is no consensus in the theoretical literature on what institutional traits of democracy
are crucial for climate policy. Thus, results based on indices that summarize multiple democracy quality dimensions could
be misleading, as their effects could balance each other out or hide the relative importance of each institutional trait. This
article examines whether the analysis of the effects of democracy quality dimensions, measured by separate indicators,
contributes to a better understanding of cross-national variance in climate policy compared to the focus on the regime
type difference, measured by democracy quality measures. Compared to earlier research, the results indicate that the
positive effect of democracy on commitment to climate cooperation depends on the realization of political rights. We find
little to support the claim that democracy quality dimensions matter for climate policy outcomes. The main implication
of our findings is that it could be fruitful to use more disaggregated democracy measures for the analysis of substantive
research questions.
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1. Introduction
This article examines whether the analysis of the effects
of specific dimensions of democracy quality, as opposed
to the focus on the regime type difference, improves
our understanding of cross-national variation in commit-
ment to climate cooperation and climate change mitiga-
tion performance. Referring to the so-called Churchill hy-
pothesis, which regards democracy as the best form of
government, political scientists study the policy perfor-
mance of democracies and autocracies. In answer to the
political recognition of global environmental change, a
growing number of studies have focused on the relation-
ship between the regime type and climate change. Em-
pirical research finds that democracies are more likely
to join international environmental agreements (e.g.,
Bernauer, Kalbhenn, Koubi, & Spilker, 2010; Neumayer,
2002a) and perform better in solving local and regional
environmental problems that do not demand consider-
able behavioral changes (e.g., Bernauer & Koubi, 2009;
Li & Reuveny, 2006; Ward, 2008; Wurster, 2013) than
their autocratic counterparts (see also Fiorino, 2011, pp.
375ff.). More recently, this conclusion has been ques-
tioned regarding global warming (e.g., Beeson, 2010;
Shearman & Smith, 2007). While quantitative research
supports the relationship between democracy and the
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 117–144 117
ratification of international climate agreements (e.g.,
Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000;
Gallagher & Thacker, 2008; Neumayer, 2002a, 2002b;
von Stein, 2008), the empirical literature is unclear about
the relevance of regime type for climate policy outcomes
(e.g., Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Fredriksson & Neumayer,
2013, 2016; Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 2002; Kneuer, 2012;
Li & Reuveny, 2006; Midlarsky, 1998; Spilker, 2012, 2013;
Wurster, 2013). Wurster (2013, p. 89) argues that “it has
become clear that a dichotomous distinction between
democracy and autocracy is not sufficient to explain
the performance results” (see also Christoff & Eckersley,
2011, p. 439).
Previous empirical research has mainly questioned
whether democracies contribute to climate protection.
However, there is no consensus in the theoretical liter-
ature on how democracy influences climate policy. Dif-
ferent aspects of democracy are emphasized as crucial
for the environment and there is no agreement on a uni-
form effect of the democracy quality dimensions (Bur-
nell, 2012; Held & Hervey, 2011; Payne, 1995). There-
fore, the question is which institutional traits of democ-
racy affect the global atmosphere (Burnell, 2012, p. 823).
This issue becomes important for the measurement of
democracy quality in the statistical analysis as well. In
accordance with their research question, empirical stud-
ies test the effect of summary measures of democracy
(e.g., from Freedom House and Polity IV) on climate pol-
icy. While several studies test the robustness of their re-
sults using multiple indicators, democracy indices vary,
not only in their validity and reliability but also in their
underlying democracy concept (e.g., Munck & Verkuilen,
2002; Pickel, Stark, & Breustedt, 2015). Moreover, re-
sults based on indices that summarize multiple democ-
racy quality dimensions could be misleading, as their ef-
fects could balance each other out or hide the relative
importance of each trait.
Our analysis contributes to the academic literature
on the measurement of democracy quality. More re-
cently, disaggregated democracy quality data for large-N
studies has been made available by the Democracy
Barometer and the Varieties of Democracy Project
(V-Dem). These indicators enable us to analyze the spe-
cific mechanisms that link democracy quality to policy
outputs and outcomes. Thus, we will be able to go be-
yond the question of whether democracy contributes
or undermines policy performance, and we will be able
to state which institutional traits of democracy are re-
sponsible for a better or worse policy performance. Sec-
ond, we contribute to comparative climate policy re-
search. Global warming is a worldwide environmental
problem. Hence, it is fruitful to analyze the willingness
and ability of governments to tackle climate change in
different institutional contexts. Only a limited amount
of work has been done regarding the effect of specific
democracy quality dimensions on climate policy (Böh-
melt, Böker, & Ward, 2016, p. 1273). Fredriksson and
Neumayer (2013, p. 18), in separate regression mod-
els, find that only the historical experience of executive
constraints and not the cumulative effect of competi-
tion leads to stricter climate policies. On the contrary,
Wurster (2013, pp. 86f.) ascertains that there is no sig-
nificant effect of checks and balances on carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions. To our knowledge, the effects of multi-
ple democracy quality dimensions on climate policy have
not been studied simultaneously.
Our main argument is that, if democracy quality has
an impact at all, it is political rights that contribute to
climate protection. Since solving global warming implies
considerable changes in our daily lives and economy, it
depends foremost on a demand for suchmeasures by the
citizenry. Political rights together with an independent
civil society enable citizens to inform themselves about
global environmental change, and they enable support-
ers of climate change mitigation to pressure the govern-
ment via the media and public opinion to address global
warming. In comparison, there is little reason to believe
that competitive elections alone make governments im-
plement climate policies. The diffuse character of the
climate change problem makes it unlikely that emission
reductions are relevant for most citizens’ decisions in
elections or their organization and participation in po-
litical parties. In addition, democratic governments are
presumably reluctant to adopt stricter climate policies
due to the considerable short-term socio-economic costs
which could affect their re-election. While checks and
balances imply that more interests are considered, veto
players with divergent interests are likely to hinder the
adoption of stricter climate policies. Civil rights enable in-
dividuals to focus on their self-interest even if it is against
the common interest of environmental protection. How-
ever, they might also contribute, via the rule of law, to
the acceptance of international agreements and the im-
plementation of climate policies.
To answer our research question, we test the effects
of four democracy quality dimensions—electoral and
horizontal accountability, political and civil rights—on cli-
mate policy commitment and performance using data
from the V-Dem-Project (Coppedge et al., 2017; Pem-
stein et al., 2017). We agree with Bättig and Bernauer
(2009) that it is important to distinguish between com-
mitment and performance. Compared to climate change
mitigation, participation in climate cooperation comes
with little cost.With the democracymeasures fromPolity
IV and Freedom House (Freedom House, 2017; Marshall,
Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016), we show the differences of our
analytic strategy compared to former publications on
the relationship between democracy and global warm-
ing. The focus on the effect of democracy quality lim-
its the analysis to countries that have been classified as
“free” or “partly-free” by Freedom House in the major-
ity of years of our research period. Our findings shed
new light on the causal mechanisms that link democ-
racy to global warming. While results based on the Free-
dom House and Polity IV measures indicate that democ-
racy quality, in general, contributes to a commitment
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to international climate cooperation, the disaggregated
measurement approach shows that the positive effect of
democracy on commitment to climate cooperation de-
pends on the realization of political rights. We find lim-
ited support for the claim that the other democracy qual-
ity dimensions matter for climate policy outcomes.
In the next section (2), we summarize the theoreti-
cal discussion regarding our research question and for-
mulate hypotheses for the empirical analysis. The de-
pendent and independent variables are operationalized
in section 3. The following section (4) conducts cross-
sectional analyses to explore our research question. The
final section summarizes the findings and presents our
conclusions (5).
2. Institutional Traits of Democracy and Climate Policy
In our discussion of the literature on the environmen-
tal consequences of democracy quality dimensions, we
adopt the “embedded democracy” concept fromMerkel
(2004). Following Dahl, narrow definitions of democracy
focus on competitive elections and enable the analysis
of the relative performance of democracies and autoc-
racies (e.g., Wurster, 2013, p. 82). They are less suited
for the analysis of the relative importance of institu-
tional traits of democracies for climate policy. Schol-
ars disagree about what constitutes democracy besides
competitive elections (Geissel, Kneuer, & Lauth, 2016,
p. 574). Merkel’s (2004) distinction between internal
and external embeddedness enables us to focus on
the effects of political democracy and not on the hy-
potheses that link democracy to climate policy via eco-
nomic development or international cooperation (Bur-
nell, 2012; Payne, 1995). The “embedded democracy”
concept distinguishes five partial regimes, namely elec-
toral regime, political rights, civil rights, horizontal ac-
countability, and the effective power to govern. In com-
parison to democracy concepts that focus on political
rights and civil liberties (e.g., Collier & Levitsky, 1997,
p. 434; Freedom House, 2017), it identifies with the for-
mer four partial regimes the democracy-quality dimen-
sions that are regarded as the most important in the
democracy-environment literature. Our robustness anal-
yses also control for three indicators regarding the effec-
tive power to govern (see Annex). With regard to the
number of democracy quality dimensions the embedded
democracy concept is relatively parsimonious (e.g. Dia-
mond & Morlino, 2005, p. xii).
Several scholars expect that electoral accountability,
i.e. the right to participate in the free and fair election of
political authorities (Merkel, 2004, p. 42), contributes to
environmental commitment and protection. First, demo-
cratically elected governments are responsive to their cit-
izens’ policy preferences (Barrett & Graddy, 2000; Con-
gleton, 1992). The median voter should be more will-
ing to accept stricter environmental regulations since
they imply lower costs for citizens, compared to polit-
ical and economic elites that possess a larger part of
the national income (Bernauer & Koubi, 2009, p. 1356;
Congleton, 1992, pp. 416f., 421; Winslow, 2007, p. 772).
Additionally, non-elected governments might not adopt
long-term environmental policies since their power is un-
certain (Congleton, 1992, p. 417). Second, democracies
presumably providemore environmental public goods to
stay in power (Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, &
Morrow, 2003) since the price of public good provision
relative to private goods falls with the size of the winning
coalition (Cao & Ward, 2015, p. 265). Finally, Fredriks-
son, Neumayer, Damania and Gates (2005, p. 350), List
and Sturm (2006, p. 1259) and Wilson and Damania
(2005) emphasize the importance of competitive elec-
tions. Governments would only consider citizens’ policy
preferences if their participation made a difference.
The underlying assumption that citizens are climate-
friendly is questionable (Spilker, 2013; Ward, 2008,
p. 389). Empirical research finds that climate concern
varies among countries (e.g., Kim & Wolinsky-Nahmias,
2014). Moreover, democratic governments are account-
able to citizens within the nation-state and therefore
might not be willing to deal with global environmen-
tal pollution (Held & Hervey, 2011, p. 90). Additionally,
global warming mainly affects future generations and cli-
mate policies will only impact emissions in the long-term
(Bernauer & Koubi, 2009, p. 1357; Cao & Ward, 2015,
p. 271; Wurster, 2011, pp. 546f., 2013, p. 90). The diffuse
character of the climate problem makes it unlikely that
emissions are relevant formost citizens’ decisions in elec-
tions. Democratic governments might also face citizens
who are unwilling to accept the socio-economic costs
of climate change mitigation (Holden, 2002, p. 10) and,
therefore, prioritize economic development (Shearman
& Smith, 2007, pp. xivf., 83). Non-elected governments
also might not pursue climate-friendly policies; their le-
gitimacy rests on their socio-economic performance. In
sum, we expect that competitive elections cannot ex-
plain cross-national variation in commitment to climate
cooperation (Hypothesis 1a) and climate change mitiga-
tion (Hypothesis 1b). It depends on whether supporters
or opponents of climate protection are elected (see also
Wurster, Auber, Metzler, & Rohm, 2015, pp. 183f.).
In democracies, horizontal accountability (i.e. checks
and balances) makes it more likely that alternative pol-
icy choices are discussed and that the public is informed
about environmental policies and their implementation
(Burnell, 2012, p. 823; Held & Hervey, 2011; Wurster,
2013, p. 83). In comparison, the environmentalist au-
thoritarian literature emphasizes that the democratic
decision-making process hinders fast action to tackle
climate change. Democratic governments must find an
agreement with veto players with divergent economic in-
terests (Beeson, 2010, p. 289; Fliegauf & Sanga, 2010,
p. 2; Giley, 2012, p. 289; Wurster, 2011, p. 547, 2013,
p. 79). Empirical research finds no clear support that insti-
tutional constraints contribute to or impede climate pro-
tection (e.g., Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2013; Garman,
2014;Madden, 2014;Wurster, 2013). Overall, we believe
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that the positive and negative effects of horizontal ac-
countability balance each other out and assume no ef-
fect of horizontal accountability on cross-national varia-
tion on climate policy commitment and performance (Hy-
potheses 2a and 2b).
In the 1970s, greenpolitical theorists argued that civil
rights, i.e. constitutional rights that protect the individ-
ual against the state (Merkel, 2004, p. 39), contribute to
individuals following their self-interest versus the com-
mon interest of environmental protection (e.g., Hardin,
1968; Ophuls, 1977, pp. 145ff.). However, this argument
depends on the climate policy preferences of citizens. In
addition, the effectiveness of using repression to enforce
environmental policies is limited (Stehr, 2015, p. 450;
Wurster, 2013, p. 80). Civil rights enable citizens to de-
mand the implementation of climate policies via the
courts (Spilker, 2013, pp. 55, 59; Winslow, 2007, p. 772).
However, this possibility depends on existing environ-
mental regulations. In sum, we expect that civil rights do
not explain country-differences in climate policy commit-
ment and performance (Hypotheses 3a and 3b).
Many social scientists link democracy to environmen-
tal protection via political rights, i.e. freedoms of expres-
sion, association, and the media, and the autonomy of
the civil society (Merkel, 2004, p. 39). These institutional
traits enable citizens to inform themselves regarding pol-
lution (Barrett & Graddy, 2000; Bernauer, Böhmelt, &
Koubi, 2013; p. 93f.; Payne, 1995, p. 43), to express their
environmental policy-preferences (Bernauer et al., 2013,
p. 93), to form environmental interest groups (ENGOs),
to mobilize public support (Fredriksson & Neumayer,
2013, p. 12; Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 2002, p. 48), and to in-
fluence the government’s decisions (Burnell, 2009, p. 6;
Payne, 1995, p. 43). An independent civil societymakes it
more likely that citizens express their policy-preferences
(Böhmelt et al., 2016, p. 1277). Free media enables cit-
izens, journalists, and scientists to monitor government
policy (Payne, 1995, p. 45) and support technological in-
novation as well as the spread of scientific knowledge
(Gleditsch & Sverdrup, 2002, p. 47). However, powerful
special interest groups may block environmental policy
reforms (e.g., Bernauer & Koubi, 2009, p. 1357; Never
& Betz, 2014, p. 12; Shearman & Smith, 2007, pp. 89,
91) or undermine their implementation (Midlarsky, 1998,
p. 344). We expect that countries with higher levels of
political rights are more committed to climate coopera-
tion (Hypothesis 4a). Since the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions is associated with considerable short-term
costs for society and economy, climate changemitigation
is dependent on public awareness of global warming and
support for climate protection. Democratic freedoms en-
sure that diffuse interests such as climate protection are
at least considered as part of the political process. It is
presumably more difficult for the public to control cli-
mate change mitigation compared to the ratification of
climate treaties (Cao & Prakash, 2012). Thus, we expect
no effect of political rights on climate policy outcomes
(Hypotheses 4b).
To conclude, if democracy quality has an impact at
all, it is political rights that contribute to commitment
to climate cooperation. A uniform effect of the democ-
racy quality dimensions on climate policy outputs and
outcomes cannot be expected. Hence, they should be
tested separately.
3. Research Design
To answer our research question, we examine the rel-
evance of democratic institutional traits using cross-
sectional OLS regression based on country averages from
1990–2005/2010. This is because, firstly, cross-country
variations are of primary interest in this analysis. Sec-
ondly, institutional traits of democracy are relatively sta-
ble over time. Finally, we assume that political institu-
tions affect climate policy only in the long-term. The
selected period is relevant as climate change has only
been recognized at the end of the last century on the
international level as a global environmental problem.
As our focus lies on democracy quality, we examine 99
countries that have been classified by Freedom House
as “free” or “partly free” during most years of our re-
search period. Before we present the results, this section
describes the measurement of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables.
3.1. Measurement of the Dependent Variables
Following previous research, we examine climate coop-
eration commitment and state efforts to mitigate global
warming separately. Our indicator for commitment is the
climate policy output component from the climate coop-
eration index created by Bättig, Brander and Imboden
(2008); taken from Bättig and Bernauer (2009). It sum-
marizes information on state behavior within the climate
change regime (ratification and ratification delay of the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, reporting and reporting
delay, and timely financial contributions to the UNFCCC
core budget) from 1990–2005. It varies from 0–1, where
higher values imply more cooperative state behavior. Be-
cause CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas, CO2
emissions per capita can be used tomeasure climate pol-
icy outcomes. The data is taken from the online database
of the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI)
(data access in 2017). Following previous studies, we ex-
amine pollution levels. Our appendix also studies long-
term and short-term changes in CO2 emissions per capita
using cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional re-
gression analysis.
3.2. Measurement of the Independent Variables
In comparison to earlier research on the relationship be-
tween democracy and climate policy, we measure the
effect of the democracy quality dimensions side-by-side
in one regression model. Following our theoretical dis-
cussion, it is important to assess the influence of the
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democracy attributes separately. Several studies apply
multiple democracy measures with different underlying
democracy conceptions in separate regression models
(e.g., Midlarsky, 1998; Neumayer, 2002a). However, the
democracy quality dimensions should be tested simulta-
neously. Specific democracy quality indicatorsmight only
show a significant effect because they are highly corre-
lated with the other institutional traits.
The effects of the democracy quality dimensions are
captured by indicators developed by Lührmann, Mar-
quardt and Mechkova (2017) and the V-Dem project
(Coppedge et al., 2017; Pemstein et al., 2017). All indi-
cators are based on expert evaluations. Our indicator of
electoral accountability is the “Vertical Accountability In-
dex” of Lührmann et al. (2017, pp. 11ff.). This index fo-
cuses on themechanisms of formal political participation
via elections and political parties in the exercise of ac-
countability. It summarizes indicators of the quality of
free and fair elections, the percentage of the popula-
tion that is enfranchised, whether the chief executive is
elected, and whether there is the right to organize and
participate in political parties. The latter aspect enables
us to consider the assumption that competitive elections
are crucial. Checks and balances are captured by the
“Horizontal Accountability Index” (Lührmann et al., 2017,
p. 13), which represents the extent to which state in-
stitutions are able to hold the executive branch of the
government to account. Three institutions are consid-
ered in this regard: the legislature, the judiciary, and spe-
cial bodies designed for this purpose (e.g., ombudsman).
We use the “Equality before the law and individual lib-
erty Index” from V-Dem to measure the democratic sub-
dimension of civil rights. This index captures the extent
to which laws are transparent and rigorously enforced,
and whether the public administration is impartial, the
extent to which citizens enjoy access to justice, the abil-
ity to secure property rights, freedom from forced labor,
freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, as well
as freedom of religion. Finally, for the operationalization
of political rights, we apply the “Diagonal Accountability
Index” (Lührmann et al., 2017, p. 15), which captures the
extent to which citizens are able to hold a government
accountable outside of formal political participation. It
summarizes information on media freedom, civil society
characteristics, freedomof expression, and the degree to
which citizens are engaged in politics.
These variables enable us tomeasure the dimensions
of democracy quality separately and test their effects
on climate policy simultaneously. In comparison to the
disaggregated data from Freedom House and Polity IV,
they are more valid and reliable. Both Freedom House
measures and the polity2 index have validity and relia-
bility problems with regard to conceptualization, mea-
surement, and aggregation (e.g., Munck & Verkuilen,
2002). In contrast to the indicators from the Democracy
Barometer, our variables are not based on policy output
and outcome indicators. Finally, in comparison to data
from the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index,
the Democracy Barometer, and Freedom House, the V-
Dem indicators cover our country sample and the whole
research period we are interested in. We compare the
disaggregated measurement approach to the Freedom
House (2017) political rights and civil liberties indices
and the polity2 indicator from Polity IV (Marshall et al.,
2016). They have been used in most studies of democ-
racy and climate policy. The Freedom House indicators
are rescaled so that higher values on the measures from
Freedom House and Polity IV indicate higher levels of
democracy quality.
Our statistical analyses control for additional vari-
ables that have been applied in similar studies. Popu-
lation density is included as it is associated with natu-
ral resource use (Spilker, 2012). Since emissions result
mainly from economic activities, we consider the level of
economic development (GDP per capita) and economic
growth (GDP growth). Countries that export fossil fuels
should be less likely to participate in climate coopera-
tion and mitigate global warming. Thus, we control for
the percentage of merchandise exports that are fossil
fuel exports. The effect of international trade is theo-
retically ambiguous. Our indicator is the percentage of
the sum of exports and imports of a country’s GDP. Data
on our socio-economic variables come from theWDI on-
line database (data accessed in 2017). Recent research
suggests that state involvement in international govern-
mental organizations (IGOs) increases a country’s willing-
ness and ability to reduce pollution (e.g., Spilker, 2012).
Data on country memberships in IGOs comes from Peve-
house, Nordstrom and Warnke (2010). On the domes-
tic level, ENGOs pressure governments to consider en-
vironmental issues. ENGO strength is captured by data
from Bernauer et al. (2013) on the number of ENGOs
registered in a country with the International Union for
Conservation of Nature. We consider a country’s vulner-
ability to the consequences of global warming with the
climate change index from Bättig, Wild and Imboden
(2007) in Bättig and Bernauer (2009). It covers climate
variability due to global warming in comparison to natu-
ral developments on a scale from 0–1. Higher values in-
dicate higher climate variability. More vulnerable coun-
tries should be more active in this policy area (Sprinz &
Vaahtoranta, 1994).
The climate policy outcome models test, following
EKC-theory (Grossman & Krueger, 1995), a curvilinear ef-
fect of GDP per capita. We used the mean-centered vari-
ableGDPper capita to avoid problemswith non-essential
multicollinearity. Our commitment indicator is also in-
cluded as an independent variable.1 Countries that are
more committed to climate cooperation might be more
willing to reduce emissions (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009). Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables
included in the statistical analyses.
1 To acknowledge the endogeneity of commitment to climate cooperation with regard to the explanatory variables, we also examined the climate policy
outcome models with the residuals of the commitment model. The results of our climate policy outcome models stay stable.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Commitment to climate cooperation .680 .156 .226 .978
CO2 emissions per capita 4.712 5.271 .063 28.284
Electoral accountability .975 .479 .031 1.854
Horizontal accountability .799 .752 –.655 2.254
Political rights 1.106 .573 –.253 2.106
Civil rights .786 .177 .358 .995
Freedom House Political rights 5.340 1.428 2.315 7.000
Freedom House Civil liberties 5.032 1.240 2.375 7.000
Polity2 5.830 4.409 –7.133 10.000
Population density 172.413 595.542 1.557 5, 861.425
GDP per capita 13143.732 16979.596 270.110 78793.39
GDP growth 3.453 1.619 –1.786 7.553
Fuel exports 11.567 20.972 .002 95.484
Trade openness 75.843 42.91 21.977 359.634
Memberships in IGOs 67.909 19.113 33.933 123.313
ENGO strength 5.818 7.790 .000 51.444
Climate change vulnerability .489 .136 .261 .897
Notes: N = 99. The units of analysis are country averages from 1990–2010, except commitment to climate cooperation (1990–2005),
IGO membership (1990–2005) and vulnerability (1990–2005).
4. Results
4.1. Commitment to Climate Cooperation
Table 2 presents the results of our first dependent vari-
able commitment to climate cooperation from 1990–
2005. Positive skewness of variables is reduced using the
natural logarithm (ln). Tolerance values of our regres-
sion models indicate no problems with multicollinearity.
Our results remain stable if we apply robust standard er-
rors. Regarding the control variables, our models show
that trade openness contributes to commitment. R2 val-
ues increase considerably when we exclude outliers (see
Annex). While nearly all democracy aspects are associ-
ated with higher levels of climate policy commitment,
only the effect of political rights is significant. Electoral
accountability is negatively but insignificantly associated
with commitment. This supports our hypotheses 1a, 2a
and 3a that electoral and horizontal, as well as civil rights
cannot explain country-differences in commitment to cli-
mate cooperation. In accordance with hypothesis 4a, we
find that countries with high levels of political rights are
also more committed.
Models 2–4 in Table 2 show that both Freedom
House indicators and the polity2 indicator have a posi-
tive and significant effect on commitment. If the democ-
racy quality dimensions are examined in separate mod-
els, each contributes significantly to commitment as well
(see Annex). Thus, the summary measures exhibit sig-
nificant positive effects as they either encompass polit-
ical rights indicators or are highly correlated with politi-
cal rights.
We performed several robustness analyses (see An-
nex). Testing cumulative effects of the democracy quality
dimensions (Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2013; Gallagher &
Thacker, 2008) from 1950–2005/2010, we yield the same
conclusions. Our results also remain stable if we control
for the Annex-I status and the level of CO2 emissions per
capita. If we add countries classified as “not free” for
most years from 1990–2010, the positive effect of polit-
ical rights on commitment is also significant. The results
of the commitment model remain stable if we estimate
ourmodels without outliers and if we exclude developed
countries or countries from a particular region.
Following our theoretical expectations, political
rights might contribute to commitment since they en-
able citizens and interest groups to pressure the govern-
ment to consider climate change. However, we find no
significant interaction effect between political rights and
ENGO influence (see Annex). This finding might result
from our indicator of the political influence of ENGOs
which just counts the number of domestic ENGOs. In
addition, many domestic ENGOs focus on local environ-
mental problems (Never & Betz, 2014, p. 12).
4.2. Climate Change Mitigation
Table 3 summarizes the results for average CO2 emis-
sions per capita levels (ln) from 1990–2010. In our mod-
els, population density, fuel exports and, contrary to our
expectations, ENGO strength contribute to emissions. In
accordance with EKC-research, we find an inverse U-
shaped relationship between GDP per capita and CO2
emissions per capita. The findings support that growth,
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Table 2. Democracy quality dimensions and climate cooperation commitment (OLS regression analysis).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population density (ln) .008 .004 .013 .000
(.010) (.009) (.009) (.010)
GDP per capita (ln) –.002 –.005 –.017 .015
(.016) (.014) (.014) (.014)
GDP growth .006 .006 .006 .010
(0.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Fuel exports (ln) –.008 –.005 .002 –.012
(.012) (.012) (.011) (.012)
Trade openness (ln) .091** .078** .058* .072**
(.035) (.033) (.032) (.035)
Memberships in IGOs .000 .001 .000 .001
(.001) (0.001) (.001) (0.001)
ENGO strength (ln) .036∗ .021 .027 .020
(.021) (.020) (.019) (.022)
Climate change vulnerability –.028 –.073 –.027 –.116
(.099) (.095) (.091) (.100)
Electoral accountability –.009
(.060)
Horizontal accountability .010
(.031)
Political rights .106**
(.049)
Civil rights .138
(.158)
Freedom House Political rights .061***
Freedom House Civil liberties (.013) .093***
(.016)
Polity2 .013***
(.004)
Countries 99 99 99 99
R2 .452 .451 .503 .391
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages from 1990–2005.
country memberships in IGOs as well as vulnerability are
associated with lower emissions levels.
Moreover, the analysis indicates that cross-national
variation in the democracy quality dimensions does not
explain country-differences in climate policy outcomes.
In accordance with our theoretical expectations (hy-
potheses 1b, 2b, 3b and 4b), we find no effect of vertical
and horizontal accountability as well as civil and political
rights on cross-national variation in CO2 emissions. How-
ever, while political rights and horizontal accountability
are negatively associated with emission levels, electoral
accountability and civil rights show positive effects. Both
Freedom House indicators and the polity2 indicator are
not associated with emission levels.
Our results remain stable if we exclude developed
countries (see Annex). We also examined the effects of
the democracy quality dimensions on average CO2 emis-
sions in two sub-periods (1990–1999, 2000–2010). In
contrast to our theoretical expectations, we find a signif-
icant positive effect of electoral accountability on aver-
age CO2 emissions per capita from 1990–1999, if we ex-
clude countries from the Middle East and North Africa.
However, many countries might not have adopted mit-
igation measures in the early years of the international
climate change regime. Additionally, the time it takes for
climate policies to affect greenhouse gas emissions has
to be considered. The robustness analyses suggest no ef-
fect of the democracy quality dimensions on short-term
and long-term changes in CO2 emissions per capita.
It appears that the cross-national variance in politi-
cal rights explains commitment to climate cooperation
better than country-differences in vertical accountabil-
ity, horizontal accountability and civil rights. Our results
are based on correlations. Case studies could give us
more insight into the causal processes that link political
rights to commitment to international efforts to tackle
climate change. In the following, we examine Ecuador
in more detail, a country that performs well with re-
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Table 3. Democracy quality dimensions and CO2 emissions per capita, ln (OLS regression analysis).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population density (ln) .087** .093** .089** .092**
(.039) (.038) (.040) (.038)
GDP per capita (ln) .856*** .897*** .911*** .900***
(.069) (.061) (.063) (.054)
GDP per capita (ln) squared –.128*** –.135*** –.135*** –.133***
(.028) (.026) (.026) (.027)
GDP growth –.092** –.080** –.080** –.077**
(.035) (.034) (.034) (.035)
Fuel exports (ln) .249*** .235*** .229*** .235***
(.051) (.148) (.051) (.050)
Trade openness (ln) .077 .104 .096 .102
(0.157) (.004) (.146) (.147)
Memberships in IGOs –.014*** –.014*** –.013*** –.014***
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
ENGO strength (ln) .142 .152* .153* .149*
(.086) (.085) (.085) (.086)
Climate change vulnerability –1.222*** –1.218*** –1.237*** –1.221**
(.419) (.570) (.417) (.412)
Commitment to climate cooperation .535 .467 .555 .465
(.438) (.437) (.456) (.418)
Electoral accountability .347
(.268)
Horizontal accountability –.034
(.136)
Political rights –.248
(.212)
Civil rights .391
(0.675)
Freedom House Political rights .017
(.060)
Freedom House Civil liberties –.011
(.081)
Polity2 .007
(0.017)
Countries 99 99 99 99
R2 .917 .915 .915 .915
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10. The units of anal-
ysis are country averages of from 1990–2010. IGO membership, ENGO strength and commitment refer to country averages from 1990
to 2005.
gard to political rights and commitment to climate co-
operation but has deficits in another democracy quality
dimension (horizontal accountability).2 Simultaneously,
Ecuador performs above-average on our measure of cli-
mate cooperation commitment. The political system of
Ecuador is characterized by free and fair elections and
the respect of civil rights. Ecuador shows deficits with
regard to horizontal accountability during our research
period. The independence of the judiciary in Ecuador
is restricted. The executive and the legislative branches
of government have repeatedly influenced court deci-
sions for their benefit. In comparison, there are no re-
strictions on the freedoms of association, expression, or
the press. Ecuador has above average values on our po-
litical rights indicator. Since the 1990s, civil society orga-
nizations representing indigenous people have gained in
influence in the Ecuadorian political system. They have
also been organized around environmental issues such
as the ecological consequences of petroleum extraction
in the Amazon lowlands. Case studies have shown that
the Ecuadorian government’s international climate pol-
icy has been influenced by civil society organizations
(e.g. Espinosa, 2013; Martin, 2011). In the mid-1990s
domestic NGOs, scientists and indigenous groups de-
2 We use information from the country reports of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index from 2003 and 2006.
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manded a halt to oil drilling in the Ecuadorian Ama-
zon. Espinosa (2013) argues that the environmental in-
terests groups were able to change the public discourse
on petroleum extraction in the oil exporting country. The
government of President Correa was responsive to the
influence of civil society organizations (Martin, 2011, pp.
26f.). It worked together with domestic NGOs to formu-
late a proposal to the international community (Mar-
tin, 2011, pp. 31f., 39). The Ecuadorian government fi-
nally proposed that it would commit itself to not ex-
tracting the country’s largest oil reserves in the Yasuní
National Park in the Amazon and thus avoid consider-
able greenhouse gas emissions under the condition that
it would receive international financial compensation
(Martin, 2011, p. 22). Martin (2011, p. 31) concludes that
the Ecuadorian government represented the climate pol-
icy position of the civil society organizations on the inter-
national level. The example of Ecuador shows that politi-
cal rights enabled civil society to influence the country’s
climate policy (Martin, 2011, pp. 27f.). This case also il-
lustrates the difference between climate policy commit-
ment and climate changemitigation. The Ecuadorian gov-
ernment introduced the condition of financial compensa-
tion. It was, in the end, unwilling to stop oil drilling in the
Yasuní National Park since there was little financial sup-
port from the international community. With regard to
commitment to climate policy goals, states appear to be
responsive to the climate policy demands of citizens and
civil society organizations facilitated by political rights al-
though they are more reluctant to implement climate
change mitigation policies.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Our results show that the conceptualization and mea-
surement of democracy matters in comparative climate
policy research.With themeasures from FreedomHouse
and Polity IV, we observe positive effects on climate pol-
icy commitment. In comparison, the disaggregated mea-
surement approach indicates that only the realization of
political rights is crucial. The results suggest that previ-
ous research might have only found significant effects
of democracy quality measures on commitment because
they contain or are highly correlated with the dimen-
sion of political rights. This finding sheds new light on
the causal mechanisms that link democracy to commit-
ment. In accordance with our theoretical expectations,
we find that the positive effect of democracy quality de-
pends on political rights. It appears that electoral and
horizontal accountability, as well as civil rights, are not
decisive for country-differences in commitment to cli-
mate cooperation. The effect of competitive elections
depends on the electoral success of supporters and op-
ponents of climate protection. Horizontal accountability
provides incentives and constraints to participation in cli-
mate cooperation. The effect of civil rights depends on a
country’s existing climate policy regulations. We do not
believe that political rights alone contribute to climate
cooperation either. Climate change mitigation is depen-
dent on public awareness of global warming and sup-
port for climate protection. For instance, Harrison and
Sundstrom (2010) conclude from their case studies of Ky-
oto Protocol ratification that the EU member states and
Japan were able to ratify the agreement since public and
business interests supported it. In comparison, Australia
withdrew its ratification and the United States never rat-
ified it since public climate concern was low and indus-
try interest groups opposed ratification. Our argument is
that political rights enable supporters of climate change
mitigation to raise awareness of climate change, articu-
late their climate policy preferences, and mobilize pub-
lic support in the first place. These democratic freedoms
make it, therefore, more likely that diffuse interests such
as climate protection are considered in the political pro-
cess (see also Martin, 2011). For instance, Never and
Betz (2014, p. 12) demonstrate that civil society organi-
zations had no influence on climate policy in India and
South Africa since they had no access to the domestic
political decision-making process. In accordancewith our
theoretical expectations and earlier research, we find lit-
tle support for the claim that democracy quality or the
democracy quality dimensions—electoral and horizontal
accountability, political and civil rights—matter for cli-
mate policy outcomes. If at all, electoral accountability
may have been associated with higher emission levels
in the 1990s. While political rights contribute to com-
mitment to climate cooperation, they are not associated
with lower emission levels. An explanation for this find-
ing is that it is, presumably, more difficult for the public
to control the implementation of environmental policies
(Cao & Prakash, 2012).
Themain implication of our results for the analysis of
substantive research questions in empirical democracy
research is that it could be fruitful to study the impli-
cations of democracy on a disaggregated basis to gain
more analytical clarity and, therefore, to conceptualize
and measure democracy quality dimensions separately.
Further climate policy research could investigate the re-
lationship between political rights and global warming
policy in more detail. Our study has focused on institu-
tional traits. To gain more knowledge on the effect of
political rights on climate cooperation, more attention
should also be given to the policy-preferences of political
decision-makers and citizens and their interaction with
political rights. It would also be interesting to examine
the relative importance of political rights such as free-
dom of expression, freedom of association, and civil so-
ciety autonomy for climate policy. We also have not con-
sidered elements of direct democracy.
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Annex
1. Models with Indicators of the Effective Power to Govern
The concept of “embedded democracy” from Merkel (2004) distinguishes five interdependent partial regimes, namely
electoral regime, political rights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the effective power to govern. Table A1 tests, also
the effect of the effective power to govern. The effective power to governmeans that only elected authorities participate in
political decision-making processes.We considered three indicators: The Domestic Autonomy (v2svdomaut) item from the
V-DemProject (Coppedge et al., 2017; Pemstein et al., 2017) evaluates a state’s autonomy in domestic politics fromexternal
actors. The variable International autonomy (v2svinlaut) from the V-Dem Project (Coppedge et al., 2017; Pemstein et al.,
2017) captures a state’s independence in foreign policy from external actors. The external constraints (exconst) indicator
fromMarshall et al. (2016) measures constraints on the government by various accountability groups (e.g., the legislature,
the judiciary, the military). The results of our main analysis remain stable. In addition, we find a significant positive effect
of a state’s autonomy in foreign policy on commitment. In comparison, the domestic and international autonomy does
not matter for CO2 emissions per capita. The exconst indicator overlaps with our measure of horizontal accountability.
However, the results remain the same, when we exclude horizontal accountability.
Table A1. Effective power to govern and commitment to climate cooperation and CO2 emissions per capita, ln (OLS regres-
sion analysis).
(2) Commitment to climate cooperation (4) CO2 emissions per capita, ln
Population density (ln) .004 –.090**
(.009) (.040)
GDP per capita (ln) –.007 .862***
(.016) (.071)
GDP per capita (ln) squared .130***
(.031)
GDP growth .004 –.100***
(.007) (.035)
Fuel exports (ln) –.009 .254***
(.012) (.052)
Trade openness (ln) .097*** .063
(.035) (.162)
Memberships in IGOs .000 –.014***
(.001) (.004)
ENGO strength (ln) .032 .135*
(.021) (.072)
Climate change vulnerability .035 –1.111**
(.100) (.435)
Commitment to climate cooperation .435
(.447)
Electoral accountability –.047 .224
(.063) (.281)
Horizontal accountability .012 –.034
(.031) (.137)
Political rights .093* –.248
(.049) (.216)
Civil rights .178 .447
(.157) (.684)
Domestic autonomy .002 –.162
(.041) (.183)
International autonomy .068* .118
(.035) (.157)
External constraints .005 .034
(.004) (.022)
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Table A1. Effective power to govern and commitment to climate cooperation and CO2 emissions per capita, ln (OLS regres-
sion analysis). (Cont.)
(2) Commitment to climate cooperation (4) CO2 emissions per capita, ln
Countries 99 99
R2 .500 .921
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages from 1990–2005 (Model 1) and from 1990–2010 (Model 2). IGO membership, ENGO strength and commitment
refer to country averages from 1990–2005.
2. Test of the Effect of the Democracy Quality Dimensions in Separate Regression Models
The summary measures of democracy in our main analysis showed significant positive effects on commitment. In com-
parison, the separate analysis of the democracy quality dimensions found that only political rights matter for commit-
ment. Table A2 tests the effect of the democracy quality dimensions in separate regression models. Table A2 shows that
in separate regression models all democracy quality dimensions are significantly associated with commitment to climate
cooperation. This result indicates that summary measures of democracy, as well as our indicators of electoral, horizontal
accountability, and civil rights in Table A3, are only significantly associated with commitment as they are highly correlated
with political rights.
Table A3 examines the effect of the democracy quality dimensions on CO2 emissions levels in separate regressionmod-
els. In accordance with our main analysis, it suggests that the democracy quality dimensions do not matter for pollution.
Table A2. Democracy quality dimensions and commitment to climate cooperation (OLS regression analysis).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population density (ln) .000 .001 .007 .004
(.010) (.010) (.009) (.010)
GDP per capita (ln) .003 .007 .004 –.001
(.016) (.015) (.014) (.015)
GDP growth .003 .005 .006 .004
(.008) (.008) (.007) (.007)
Fuel exports (ln) –.011 –.013 –.010 –.009
(.013) (.012) (.012) (.012)
Trade openness (ln) .086** .089** .098*** .066*
(.035) (.036) (.034) (.034)
Memberships in IGOs .000 .000 .000 .000
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ENGO strength (ln) .028 .038* .035* .037*
(.022) (.021) (.020) (.021)
Climate change vulnerability .097 –.055 –.046 –.037
(.101) (.103) (.096) (.100)
Electoral accountability .134***
(.046)
Horizontal accountability .076***
(.025)
Political rights .139***
(.030)
Civil rights .411***
(.107)
Countries 99 99 99 99
R2 .374 .378 .445 .411
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages from 1990–2005.
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Table A3. Democracy quality dimensions and CO2 emissions per capita, ln (OLS regression analysis).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population density (ln) .095** .091** .088** .095**
(.038) (.038) (.039) (.039)
GDP per capita (ln) .867*** .907*** .914*** .890***
(.066) (.060) (.056) (.062)
GDP per capita (ln) squared –.131*** –.135*** –.136*** –.136***
(.026) (.026) (.026) (.026)
GDP growth –.085** –.080** –.080** –.081**
(.034) (.034) (.034) (.034)
Fuel exports (ln) .247*** .231*** .228*** .237***
(.051) (.050) (.049) (.050)
Trade openness (ln) .130 .097 .084 .098
(.038) (.149) (.152) (.146)
Memberships in IGOs –.014*** –.014*** –.013*** –.014***
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
ENGO strength (ln) .152* .154* .152* .156*
(.085) (.085) (.085) (.085)
Climate change vulnerability –1.184*** –1.229*** –1.247*** –1.199***
(.412) (.417) (.416) (.416)
Commitment to climate cooperation .396 .525 .583 .444
(.411) (.412) (.434) (.422)
Electoral accountability .189
(.195)
Horizontal accountability .001
(.106)
Political rights –.045
(.016)
Civil rights .238
(.479)
Countries 99 99 99 99
R2 .916 .915 .915 .915
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages of from 1990–2010. IGOmembership, ENGO strength and commitment refer to country averages from 1990–2005.
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3. Main Models without Influential Cases
Table A4 and A5 present our main regression models without influential cases. First, countries with standardized residuals
of at least +/−2 were successively excluded. Second, outliers were identified using Cook’s D (> 4/n), Leverage (> 3*k/n)
and DfBetas (> +/−1). The results of our commitment models stay stable (see Table A4).
With regard to CO2 emissions per capita, the positive effect of political rights on CO2 emissions per capita becomes
significant (see Table A5). However, this effect turns insignificant again if we estimate further robustness analyses with and
without influential cases.
Table A4. Democracy quality dimensions and climate cooperation commitment without influential cases (OLS regression
analysis).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population density (ln) .013* .003 .002 .002
(.007) (.006) (.007) (.007)
GDP per capita (ln) .008 .014 .008 .021
(.011) (.010) (.012) (.011)
GDP growth .002 .000 –.003 –.005
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.006)
Fuel exports (ln) .003 .014* .013 .003
(.008) (.008) (.009) (.009)
Trade openness (ln) .129 .088*** .069*** .108***
(.025) (.023) (.026) (.028)
Memberships in IGOs .000 .001** .000 .001
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ENGO strength (ln) .031** .009 .024 .006
(.015) (.013) (.015) (.017)
Climate change vulnerability .026 –.086 –.095 –.137
(.065) (.063) (.069) (.072)
Electoral accountability –.067
(.046)
Horizontal accountability .014
(.022)
Political rights .169***
(.040)
Civil rights .024
(.119)
Freedom House Political rights .039***
(.010)
Freedom House Civil liberties .065***
(.014)
Polity2 .009**
(.004)
Countries 78 76 82 84
R2 .725 .724 .678 .569
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages from 1990–2005.
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Table A5. Democracy quality dimensions and CO2 emissions per capita, ln without influential cases (OLS regression
analysis).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population density (ln) .042 .048 .040 .053*
(.034) (.035) (.036) (.034)
GDP per capita (ln) .832*** .896*** .896*** .893***
(.055) (.057) (.060) (.054)
GDP per capita (ln) squared –.135*** –.145*** –.140*** –.143***
(.023) (.022) (.023) (.022)
GDP growth –.127*** –.101*** –.087*** .092***
(.027) (.031) (.031) (.030)
Fuel exports (ln) .193*** .171*** .176*** .208***
(.044) (.045) (.044) (.042)
Trade openness (ln) .337*** .316*** .316*** .278**
(.121) (.127) (.127) (.129)
Memberships in IGOs –.007* –.009** –.008** –.007**
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.003)
ENGO strength (ln) .161** .227*** .222*** .165
(.067) (.070) (.069) (.072)
Climate change vulnerability –1.805*** –1.562*** –1.562*** –1.220***
(.357) (.374) (.380) (.369)
Commitment to climate cooperation .275 .183 .278 –.222
(.342) (.366) (.388) (.369)
Electoral accountability .355*
(.207)
Horizontal accountability –.054
(.104)
Political rights –.413**
(.181)
Civil rights .225
(.538)
Freedom House Political rights –.062
(.058)
Freedom House Civil liberties –.079
(.072)
Polity2 –.016
(.017)
Countries 86 88 90 86
R2 .958 .950 .9476.952
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages of from 1990–2010. IGOmembership, ENGO strength and commitment refer to country averages from 1990–2005.
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4. Jackknife Analysis
Using jackknife analysis, we tested whether our results depend on certain country groups. Table A6 tests the effect of
our main models without developed countries. We identified developed countries by OECD-membership. The effect of
political rights on commitment becomes insignificant if we exclude developed countries. However, it becomes significant
if we exclude outliers. The following countries are identified as outliers in model 1 in Table A6: Central African Republic,
Republic Congo, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Gambia, Kuwait, New Zealand, Singapore, Ukraine, and Zambia.
The results of CO2 emissions per capita model remain stable.
Table A6. Democracy quality dimensions, commitment to climate cooperation and CO2 emissions per capita, ln in non-
developed countries (OLS regression analysis).
(1) Commitment (2) Commitment to (3) CO2 emissions (4) CO2 emissions
to climate climate cooperation per capita, ln per capita,
cooperation without influential ln without
cases influential cases
Population density (ln) .006 .002 .107* .016
(.011) (.009) (.053) (.042)
GDP per capita (ln) .005 .024 .798*** .723***
(.045) (.017) (.108) (.076)
GDP per capita (ln) squared –.121** –.128***
(.057) (.041)
GDP growth .009 .010 –.122** –.190***
(.009) (.007) (.049) (.030)
Fuel exports (ln) –.013 .000*** .290*** .189***
(.015) (.011) (.071) (.047)
Trade openness (ln) .039 .066* .203 .679***
(.039) (.034) (.258) (.165)
Memberships in IGOs –.001 –.001 –.012 .004
(.002) (.001) (.008) (.005)
ENGO strength (ln) .012 .012* .165 .287***
(.026) (.020) (.125) (.079)
Climate change vulnerability .034 .088 –1.157** –2.061***
(.111) (.080) (.523) (.370)
Commitment to climate cooperation 1.148 1.000**
(.652) (.437)
Electoral accountability .056 –.042 .199 –.021
(.071) (.053) (.353) (.222)
Horizontal accountability –.002 –.002 –.033 –.034
(.035) (.027) (.171) (.108)
Political rights .065 .084* –.201 .217
(.056) (.048) (.307) (.200)
Civil rights .084 .144 .357 –.122
(.173) (.139) (.918) (.589)
Countries 68 57 68 56
R2 .321 .488 .891 .962
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10. The units of
analysis are country averages of from 1990–2005 (Model 1–2) and from 1990–2010 (Model 2–4). IGO membership, ENGO strength and
commitment refer to country averages from 1990–2005.
The results of our analysis of commitment to climate cooperation also remain stable if we exclude countries from particular
regions. Tables A7, A8 and A9 summarize the results of our jackknife-analysis. We applied the World Bank country classifi-
cation by region (https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-
groups). The positive effect of political rights on commitment to climate cooperation remains significant in nearly all re-
gression models (see Table A6). It becomes marginally insignificant if countries from East European or from Southeastern
European countries are removed from the analysis. However, if we estimate the models without influential cases the ef-
fect of political rights becomes significant again (see Table A7). If we exclude countries from Sub-Sahara Africa, we find a
significant negative effect of electoral accountability on commitment. In addition, several models without outliers exhibit
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a significant negative effect of electoral accountability and a significant positive effect of civil rights on commitment. How-
ever, these effects are not as robust as the effect of political rights. In our analysis without countries from the Middle East
and North Africa, electoral accountability is significantly associated with CO2 emissions per capita (see Table A9). Model 2
and 4 in table A14 show that the significant positive effect of electoral accountability, in the analysis of our sample without
countries from the Middle East and Northern Africa, is only stable for the period from 1990–1999. Political rights are neg-
atively associated with CO2 emissions per capita if we exclude countries from Central Asia or Latin America (see Model 1
and 4 in Table A9). However, this effect becomes insignificant if we estimate further robustness analyses.
Table A7. Jackknife analysis: Democracy quality dimensions and commitment to climate cooperation (OLS regression
analysis).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Central East East Latin Middle North South South Sub- Western
Asia Asia and Europe American East and America Asia East Saharan European
Pacific North Europe Africa
Africa
Population .008 .016 .008 .005 .010 .009 .012 .006 –.010 .009
density (ln) (.068) (.011) (.010) (.012) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.011) (.010)
GDP per capita –.002 –.005 –.005 –.012 .004 .002 –.008 .001 .005 –.004
(ln) (–.015) (.018) (.017) (.019) (.017) (.017) (.018) (.017) (.021) (0.18)
GDP growth .007 .004 –.001 .009 .008 .007 .008 .006 .007 .008
(.008) (.008) (.009) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Fuel exports (ln) –.008 –.006 –.009 –.011 .000 –.009 –.007 –.012 –.005 –.003
(.012) (.013) (.013) (.015) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.012) (.013) (.014)
Trade openness .091** .085** .097*** .115*** .073** .079** .089** .082** .094** .073*
(ln) (.035) (.018) (.036) (.041) (.036) (.036) (.037) (.035) (.038) (.042)
Memberships .000 .000 .000 .000 –.001 .000 .000 .000 .001 –.001
in IGOs (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ENGO strength .035* .047** .042** .037 .024 .038* .050** .023 .031 .030
(ln) (.021) (.022) (.021) (.024) (.021) (.021) (.023) (.021) (.168) (.024)
Climate change –.024 –.005 –.018 .032 –.040 –.039 –.081 –.058 .011 .003
vulnerability (.100) (.102) (.106) (.188) (.099) (.099) (.109) (.100) (.100) (.066)
Electoral –.006 –.028 –.015 .018 .021 –.024 –.021 .058 –.138* .020
accountability (.061) (.062) (.062) (.074) (.062) (.061) (.065) (.062) (.072) (.066)
Horizontal .011 .016 .014 –.007 .015 .009 .016 .014 .005 –.012
accountability (.032) (.032) (.032) (.039) (.073) (.031) (.034) (.032) (.035) (.035)
Political rights .107** .099* .083 .131** .095* .112** .124** .071 .136** .102*
(.049) (.058) (.108) (.060) (.052) (.049) (.052) (.157) (.055) (.054)
.051) .050)
Civil rights .126 .206 .162 .205 .100 .142 .071 .042 .267 .167
(.161) (.187) (.160) (.183) (.158) (.158) (.171) (.158) (.199) (.169)
Countries 98 87 90 78 95 97 94 93 77 83
R2 .451 .489 .438 .529 .465 .457 .454 .465 .470 .380
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages from 1990–2005.
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Table A8. Jackknife analysis: Democracy quality dimensions and commitment to climate cooperation without outliers (OLS
regression analysis).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Central East East Latin Middle North South South Sub- Western
Asia Asia and Europe American East and America Asia East Saharan European
Pacific North Europe Africa
Africa
Population .008 .013* .015** .019*** .015** .020*** .019*** .006 .005 .007
density (ln) (.007) (.008) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.010)
GDP per capita .017 .010 .007 .000 .008 .008 .004 .003 .015 .015
(ln) (.012) (.013) (.010) (.010) (.012) (.010) (.005) (.011) (.013) (.013)
GDP growth .003 .001 .005 .010 .000 .012*** .019***–.001 .012** .012*
(.006) (.006) .005) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.007) (.005) (.006) (.006)
Fuel exports (ln) .005 .001 .005 .021** .005 .019** .001 .006 .010 .009
(.008) (.009) (.007) (.009) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.010)
Trade openness .125*** .091*** .142*** .146*** .122*** .124*** .132 .157*** .116*** .084***
(ln) (.026) (.032) (.022) (.025) (.027) (.021) (.013) (.024) (.025) (.030)
Memberships .000 –.001 .001 .000 –.001 .000 –.001 .000 .001 –.001
in IGOs (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ENGO strength .039** .056*** .047*** .047*** .033** .044*** .058*** .040*** .044** .021
(ln) (.015) (.018) (.013) (.013) (.016) (.012) (.016) (.015) (.016) (.018)
Climate change –.003 .012 .104* .278** .021 .173*** –.055 –.009 .082 .081
vulnerability (.068) (.069) (.058) (.107) (.067) (.062) (.073) (.063) (.063) (.076)
Electoral –.058 –.088* –.088** –.028 –.040 –.094*** –.085* –.043 –.145*** –.033
accountability (.045) (.049) (.038) (.042) (.049) (.034) (.046) (.043) (.022) (.049)
Horizontal .00 .045* .006 –.018 .004 .004 .028 .013 .003 –.016
accountability (.022) (.023) (.020) (.020) (.024) (.018) (.023) (.021) (.022) (.026)
Political rights .143*** .146*** .126*** .113*** .201*** .123*** .211*** .151*** .142*** .091*
(.040) (.048) (.034) (.037) (.046) (.032) (.039) (.038) (.038) (.045)
Civil rights .073 .097 .156 .269** –.029 .271*** –.089 .051 .239* .204
(.122) (.135) (.099) (.113) (.123) (.096) (.120) (.109) (.122) (.131)
Countries 80 72 67 60 77 74 76 71 60 70
R2 .726 .736 .797 .843 .739 .815 .730 .789 .784 .577
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages from 1990–2005.
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Table A9. Jackknife analysis: Democracy quality dimensions and CO2 emissions per capita, ln (OLS regression analysis).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Central East East Latin Middle North South South Sub- Western
Asia Asia and Europe American East and America Asia East Saharan European
Pacific North Europe Africa
Africa
Population .086** .142*** .086** .011 .098** .098** .069 .086** .036 .098**
density (ln) (.039) (.045) (.040) (.043) (.039) (.040) (.042) (.040) (.042) (.045)
GDP per capita .865*** .866*** .877*** .846*** .810*** .832*** .891*** .887*** .771*** .863***
(ln) (.070) (.072) (.072) (.070) (.071) (.070) (.071) (.072) (.100) (.080)
GDP per capita –.131*** –.109*** –.128*** –.173*** –.115*** –.136*** –.125***–.124*** –.096** –.096**
(ln) squared (.028) (.030) (.029) (.028) (.030) (.028) (.028) (.029) (.041) (.037)
GDP growth –.082** –.109*** –.055 –.093** –.115*** –.096*** –.105***–.083** –.062 –.113***
(.036) (.030) (.040) (.036) (.035) (.035) (.035) (.036) (.042) (.040)
Fuel exports (ln) .240*** .260*** .241*** .219*** .274*** .253*** .227*** .254*** .258*** .257***
(.052) (.053) (.054) (.057) (.054) (.051) (.052) (.053) (.060) (.059)
Trade openness .067 .050 .032 –.065 .098 .104 .083 .023 .166 .204
(ln) (.158) (.178) (.161) (.171) (.156) (.158) (.156) (.162) (.180) (.205)
Memberships –.013*** –.016*** –.015*** –.009** –.015*** –.013*** –.014***–.015*** –.008 –.010
in IGOs (.004) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.006)
ENGO strength .133 .184** .100 .193** .130 .096 .100 .146 .057 .275*
(ln) (.086) (.091) (.088) (088) (.086) (.088) (.093) (.089) (.111) (.101)
Climate change –1.190***–1.003** –1.204*** –2.617*** –1.146*** –1.187*** –.886* –1.152** –1.169** –1.218***
vulnerability (.420) (.424) (.455) (.699) (.415) (.417) (.447) (.439) (.447) (.453)
Commitment .517 .278 .735 .581 .483 .594 .624 .683 .056 .748
to climate (.438) (.457) (.466) (.452) (.445) (.441) (.435) (.470) (.542) (.504)
cooperation
Electoral .360 .364 .337 .450 .514* .404 .300 .225 .142 .252
accountability (.268) (.270) (.273) (.283) (.283) (.268) (.279) (.283) (.369) (.293)
Horizontal –.030 –.057 –.017 .097 –.129 –.013 –.078 –.079 –.027 .006
accountability (.136) (.135) (.140) (.150) (.138) (.135) (.143) (.141) (.161) (.154)
Political rights –.233 –.453* –.211 –.614** –.060 –.289 –.323 –.189 –.175 –.065
(.212) (.237) (.218) (.017) (.260) (.212) (.220) (.219) (.261) (.780)
Civil rights .316 1.168 .355 .265 .260 .373 .843 .469 .672 .065
(.678) (.773) (.685) (.028) (.670) (.669) (.710) (.690) (.917) (.780)
Countries 98 87 90 78 95 97 94 93 77 83
R2 .919 .928 .920 .944 .922 .918 .920 .922 .853 .911
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages from 1990–2010. IGO membership, ENGO strength and commitment refer to country averages from 1990–2005.
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5. Cumulative Effects of Democracy Quality Dimensions from 1950–2005/2010
Following Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013), we tested the cumulative effects of the democracy quality dimensions. Ta-
ble A10 uses the sum of the values of the democracy quality dimensions from 1950 to 2005 (dependent variable: commit-
ment to international climate cooperation)/2010 (dependent variable: CO2 emissions per capita, ln) as an independent
variable. We come to the same conclusions as in our main analysis of the current values of the democracy quality dimen-
sions. The long-term experience with political rights contributes to a commitment to climate cooperation. There are no
significant effects of a country’s historical experiencewith electoral and horizontal accountability or political and civil rights
on climate policy outcomes.
Table A10. Democracy quality dimensions (cumulative effect from 1950–2010), commitment to climate cooperation and
CO2 emissions per capita, ln (OLS regression analysis).
(1) Commitment (2) Commitment to (3) CO2 emissions (4) CO2 emissions
to climate climate cooperation per capita, ln per capita, ln
cooperation without influential
cases
Population density (ln) .008 .013* .080** .049
(.010) (.007) (.037) (.035)
GDP per capita (ln) –.002 .008 .868*** .927***
(.016) (.011) (.063) (.060)
GDP per capita (ln) squared –.143*** –.116***
(.031) (.027)
GDP growth .006 .002 –.096*** –.074**
(.007) (.005) (.035) (.031)
Fuel exports (ln) –.008 .003 .274*** .210***
(.012) (.008) (.049) (.046)
Trade openness (ln) .091** .129 .168 .256**
(.035) (.025) (.147) (.060)
Memberships in IGOs .000 .000** –.015*** –.009**
(.001) (.001) (.004) (.004)
ENGO strength (ln) .036* .031 .186** .234***
(.021) (.015) (.083) (.071)
Climate change vulnerability –.029 .026 –1.265*** –1.350***
(.099) (.065) (.410) (.373)
Commitment to climate cooperation .249 .146
(.391) (.349)
Electoral accountability –.001 –.004 .001 .000
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Horizontal accountability .001 .001 .001 –.002
(.002) (.001) (.003) (.002)
Political rights .007** .010*** –.003 –.003
(.003) (.002) (.003) (.003)
Civil rights .009 .002 .009 .004
(.010) (.007) (.008) (.007)
Countries 99 78 98 87
R2 .452 .726 .925 .954
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10. The units of
analysis are country averages from 1990–2005 (Model 1–2) and from 1990–2010 (Model 3–4). IGO membership, ENGO strength and
commitment refer to country averages from 1990–2005.
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6. Main Model of Commitment to Climate Cooperation with Interaction Effect between ENGO Strength and
Political Rights
We tested an interaction effect between ENGO strength and political rights (see table A11). The assumption is that political
rights enable citizens to organize in ENGOs and exert influence via public opinion policy outputs. The results indicate no
significant interaction effect between ENGO strength and political rights. It has to be considered that the number of ENGOs
captures only the number of ENGO’s in a country. However, alternative measures were only available for a limited number
of countries.
Table A11. Interaction effect between ENGO strength and political liberties (OLS regression analysis).
(1) Commitment to climate cooperation (2) CO2 emissions per capita, ln
Population density (ln) .007 .088∗∗
(.010) (.040)
GDP per capita (ln) .000 .853***
(.017) (.070)
GDP per capita (ln) squared –.132***
(.030)
GDP growth .005 .090**
(.007) (.088)
Fuel exports (ln) –.008 .250***
(.012) (.052)
Trade openness (ln) .086** .082
(.036) (.159)
Memberships in IGOs .000 –.014***
(.001) (.004)
ENGO strength (ln) .036* .141
(.021) (.086)
Climate change vulnerability –.035 –1.223***
(.100) (.421)
Commitment to climate cooperation .547
(.442)
Electoral accountability –.013 .344
(.100) (.269)
Horizontal accountability .010 –.030
(.032) (.030)
Political rights .100* –.236
(.050) (.216)
Civil rights –.020 .377
(.029) (.680)
ENGOlnXpolitical rights –.020 .045
(.029) (.127)
Countries 99 99
R2 .455 .918
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages of from 1990–2005 (Model 1) and from 1990–2010 (Model 2). IGO membership, ENGO strength and commitment
refer to country averages from 1990–2005.
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7. Control of Annex-I Status
International climate change regime distinguishes between Annex-I and non-Annex-I countries. Annex-I (Developed) coun-
tries are regarded as historically responsible for global warming and, therefore, should take the lead in climate change
mitigation. Thereby, the Kyoto Protocol specified legally binding greenhouse gas emissions targets for Annex-I member
states. Table A12 controls the effect of the Annex-I status on commitment to climate cooperation. Overall, our results
remain stable.
Table A12. Annex-I status and commitment to climate cooperation (OLS regression analysis).
(1) Commitment to climate cooperation
Population density (ln) .007
(.010)
GDP per capita (ln) –.006
(.018)
GDP per capita (ln) squared .007
(.008)
GDP growth .007
(.008)
Fuel exports (ln) –.007
(.012)
Trade openness (ln) .092**
(.035)
Memberships in IGOs .000
(.000)
ENGO strength (ln) .038*
(.021)
Climate change vulnerability .003
(.115)
Electoral accountability –.007
(.060)
Horizontal accountability .009
(.032)
Political rights .102**
(.050)
Civil rights .12
(.159)
Annex I country .026
(.048)
Countries 99
R2 .454
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages of from 1990–2005.
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8. Control of CO2 Emissions Per Capita
Table A13 adds CO2 emissions per capita, ln, as an additional control variable in our analysis of commitment to climate
change cooperation. Countries with low emission levels might be more willing to enter international climate change
treaties than countries with high emission levels. The results of our main model in Table 2 remain stable. In contrast
with our expectations, we find a positive but insignificant effect of CO2 emission per capita on commitment to climate
cooperation.
Table A13. Democracy quality dimensions and commitment to climate cooperation (OLS regression analysis).
(1) Commitment to climate cooperation
Population density (ln) .005
(.010)
GDP per capita (ln) –.025
(.026)
GDP growth .008
(.008)
Fuel exports (ln) –.015
(.014)
Trade openness (ln) .084**
(.036)
Memberships in IGOs .000
(.000)
ENGO strength (ln) .031
(.021)
Climate change vulnerability –.004
(.102)
Electoral accountability –.026
(.062)
Horizontal accountability .017
(.032)
Political rights .107**
(.049)
Civil rights .135
(.158)
CO2 emissions per capita, ln .026
(.024)
Countries 99
R2 .460
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages of from 1990–2005.
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9. Democracy Quality Dimensions and Average CO2 Emissions in Two Sub-Periods (1990–1999, 2000–2010)
We also estimated our climate policy outcome model for two sub-periods—1990–1999 and 2000–2010. Table A13 shows,
as in our main analysis, no significant effects of the democracy quality dimensions on CO2 emissions per capita. Model 2
and 4 in table A13 show that the significant positive effect of electoral accountability in the analysis of our sample without
countries from the Middle East and Northern Africa is only stable for the period from 1990–1999.
Table A14. Democracy quality dimensions and CO2 emissions per capita, ln (OLS regression analysis).
(1) 1990–1999 (2) 1990–1999 (3) 2000–2010 (4) 2000–2010
Without countries Without countries
from Middle East from Middle East
and North Africa and North Africa
Population density (ln) .077* .084* .093** .098**
(.046) (.046) (.045) (.046)
GDP per capita (ln) .861*** .858*** .942*** .927***
(.074) (.074) (.074) (.078)
GDP per capita (ln) squared –.114*** –.098*** –.137*** –.129***
(.032) (.033) (.031) (.033)
GDP growth –.094*** –.096*** .008 –.002
(.023) (.023) (.043) (.049)
Fuel exports (ln) .185*** .213*** .216*** .233***
(.056) (.056) (.057) (.060)
Trade openness (ln) .066 .065 .022 –.017
(.158) (.157) (.169) (.172)
Memberships in IGOs –.016*** –.018*** –.011** –.013**
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.005)
ENGO strength (ln) .166* .144 .106 .099
(.098) (.099) (.083) (.085)
Climate change vulnerability –1.105*** –1.050** –1.052** –1.046**
(.463) (.460) (.455) (.466)
Commitment to climate cooperation .866 .728 .736 .659
(.527) (.524) (.469) (.480)
Electoral accountability .361 .486* .061 .150
(.137) (.281) (.259) (.278)
Horizontal accountability –.135 –.218 –.016 –.046
(.137) (.141) (.143) (.147)
Political rights –.150 .053 –.333 –.284**
(.232) (.246) (.241) (.251)
Civil rights .532 .220 .811 .773
(.680) (.688) (.781) (.792)
Countries 90 87 95 92
R2 .914 .919 .907 .907
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10. The units of
analysis are country averages of from 1990–1999 (Model 1–2) and from 2000–2010 (Model 3–4). IGO membership, ENGO strength and
commitment refer to country averages from 1990–2005.
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10. Democracy Quality Dimensions and Changes in CO2 Emissions over Time
10.1. Dependent Variable: Linear Trend in CO2 Emissions Per Capita from 1990 to 2010
Our main analysis focuses on variation in CO2 emissions per capita among countries. Table A15 tests our model on the
variation of long-term changes in CO2 emissions among countries. For this purpose, we estimated for each country the
slope (unstandardized regression coefficient) of our year variable on CO2 emissions per capita from 1990–2010. The slopes
of each country constitute our measure of long-term changes in CO2 emissions per capita in the cross-sectional OLS re-
gression analysis (slope regression) in Table A15 (Babones, 2014). We find no significant effect of the democracy quality
dimensions on the linear trend of CO2 emissions per capita.
Table A15. Democracy quality dimensions and CO2 emissions per capita, ln long-term changes (OLS regression analy-
sis/slope regression).
(1)
Population density (ln) –.003
(.011)
GDP per capita (ln) .030
(.020)
GDP per capita (ln) squared .001
(.008)
GDP growth .027***
(.010)
Fuel exports (ln) .020
(.015)
Trade openness (ln) –.085*
.045)
Memberships in IGOs –.001
(.001)
ENGO strength (ln) –.049*
(.025)
Climate change vulnerability .343***
(.120)
Commitment to climate cooperation .033
(.125)
Electoral accountability .030
(.077)
Horizontal accountability .018
(.039)
Political rights .048
(.061)
Civil rights –.164
(.193)
Countries 99
R2 .266
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p< .01, ** p< .05, * p< .10. The units of analysis
are country averages of from 1990–2010. IGOmembership, ENGO strength and commitment refer to country averages from 1990–2005.
The dependent variable is the linear trend of CO2 emissions per capita from 1990–2010.
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10.2. Dependent Variable: Annual Changes in CO2 Emissions Per Capita
We estimated pooled OLS regressionmodels with annual changes of CO2 emission per capita as a dependent variable (first
differences) with country and year dummies. As we have only annual data on state memberships in IGOs and the number
of ENGOs in a country until 2005, these models only analyze the CO2 emission changes from 1990–2005. Table A15 finds
no effect of the institutional traits of democracy on annual changes in CO2 emission per capita.
Table A16. Democracy quality dimensions and CO2 emissions per capita, ln short-term changes (OLS regression analy-
sis/slope regression).
(1)
Population density (ln) –.039
(.081)
GDP per capita (ln) –.005
(.043)
GDP per capita (ln) squared –.005
(.010)
GDP growth .006∗∗∗
(.001)
Fuel exports (ln) .000
(.008)
Trade openness (ln) .000
(.000)
Memberships in IGOs –.000
(.001)
ENGO strength (ln) .002
(.012)
Electoral accountability .008
(.018)
Horizontal accountability .012
(.017)
Political rights –.034
(.029)
Civil rights .050
(.0830)
Observations 1160
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10.
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